Idealization in History

Picture of Omri D. Cohen on Unsplash

That humans spontaneously idealize and that their idealizations shape them may seem obvious, but the obviousness vanishes when one considers the extent of their knowledge and achievements, which have literally transformed the Earth, not just on the surface. How to distinguish imagination from reality when the former models the latter? The answer to this question seems particularly delicate and yet fundamental from a psychological point of view, as our societies have the habit of projecting to the forefront, alternatively, idealization and disillusionment, manifesting a structural emotional swing, in other words, an imbalance.

It is not a matter here of conducting a tedious and probably impossible inventory of contemporary idealizations, as these unfold in all social spheres, but of focusing on a handful of major idealizations in human history, and more particularly in the history of the West, in order to highlight how much they guide people.

Human Power

Throughout time, humans have idealized materials, plants, animals, places, planets, and especially, for a few millennia, themselves. Thus, Greek myths and the Judeo-Christian tradition recount extraordinary actions that form the basis of religious faith, such as the exploits of Heracles or Achilles, or the miracles performed by prophets. If the powers of these ancient heroes come from deities, these are depicted with human traits, and their proteges accomplish feats, both individual and collective, that surpass those of animals.

However, Homo sapiens has not always considered itself superior to other species: according to Jean-Paul Demoule, emeritus professor of European protohistory at the Sorbonne, in the Paleolithic, “One can think that humans perceive themselves […] as an animal species among others, in the minority and more vulnerable than others.1 […] In fact, some traditional societies are organized into clans or groups, each bearing the name of an animal, which can sometimes be the mythical ancestor of this group, sometimes called a totem.”2 The gods of Egypt probably served as intermediaries between the admiration of certain animals and the worship of deities with human faces.

Archaeological data show that gods became humanized during the Neolithic, an era characterized by progressive settlement, the emergence of agriculture, and the development of certain techniques such as metallurgy, pottery, or the wheel. As hunter-gatherers, humans were closely dependent on climatic conditions. By settling down, they were able to reduce this servitude, gain control over nature, especially by domesticating certain animals used for cultivating fields. The relationship to nature and animals underwent a metamorphosis, and religions reflect these changes: Greek and Judeo-Christian myths allegorically and hyperbolically manifest the power of humanity. This power is not distributed uniformly or equitably to individuals; it is granted in a privileged way to certain people rather than others.

The secularization of Western societies has not erased the mythical part of power ideals, which persists in various religious beliefs and in narratives of heroes accomplishing extraordinary acts, especially because they possess superpowers. These narratives, where the eternal struggle of good against a caricatural evil is reinterpreted by varying locations, characters, their abilities, and twists, are mass-produced by the entertainment industry.

On political and economic levels, mythical power is expressed in ideologies that, from left to right, prioritize the wealth of nations or companies to which they apply. Mythical power also manifests itself in the unquenchable ambitions of leaders, especially in a spirit of conquest whose horizon, in perpetual expansion, already extends to the Solar system.

The keystone of real human power, the mind, has probably been the most idealized and mysterious faculty. How could imagination not be carried away when our perceptions bring us into contact with events and things that surpass us, that escape, in whole or in part, our understanding? Wonder at the extent, diversity, and beauty of the cosmos has probably changed little over the centuries, apart from its secularization: nowadays, images captured by the James Webb Telescope regularly make headlines and bring about questioning of scientific theories.3 Regarding ideas apprehended by the mind, in the mid-20th century, L. Wittgenstein marvelled at the ‘hardness of the logical must.’ Mathematics and logic generated greater perplexity in ancient Greece, as evidenced by Pythagorean theories that place numbers at the origin of the universe. The same was true for central philosophical concepts such as being, reason, truth, justice, good, nature, etc.4

While mythical and philosophical idealizations can increase the distance between thought and reality, scientific idealizations regularly partake in a reverse dynamic.5 Those called ‘Aristotelian’ idealizations, obtained by abstracting from a set of things or dimensions, allow considering properties or characteristics in isolation. ‘Galilean’ idealizations, although distorting reality, for example, by likening objects to points or imagining frictionless movements on a plane, nevertheless take part in effectively modelling the movements of bodies in space.

Historically, scientific idealizations have somewhat reduced the distance between thought and reality, which has not been painless as S. Freud pointed out by mentioning three major “narcissistic wounds” for humanity: the discovery of heliocentrism by Copernicus, the discovery of evolution by Darwin, and the discovery of the unconscious by psychology at the turn of the 20th century. A new frustration, probably greater than the previous ones, could now be added: artificial intelligence. After the upheavals of computing, it induces a profound questioning about the place of humans on Earth and in the universe.

It should not be concluded from the preceding remarks that sciences de-idealize: they contribute as much to humility as to excess, as they establish techniques that extend human beings’ power. Thus, just as during the Neolithic revolution, the methods and instruments developed abundantly over the past three centuries gave rise to the idea that people could master nature, bringing the biblical narrative of Genesis to fruition. Climate change leads to a new disillusionment with unrestrained idealizations, at least for those who do not deny it.

As mentioned in the previous article, the positive perception of domination has eroded over time under the influence of the principle of freedom. Is the same true for power ideals? With, on the one hand, the resurgence of authoritarianism and conflicts, and on the other hand, the intensification of economic competition, does the idea of power not assert itself more regularly and explicitly in discourse? Power as a shield for work and, more generally, for the way of life can be used legitimately. It has been so since the beginning of history: freedom, as the possibility for a group to preserve its institutions and customs, takes refuge under the aegis of power when it is threatened.

Love

Just as idealizations of human power are based on scientific and technical realities, those of love are rooted in biology, both from a physiological and evolutionary perspective.

American anthropologist Helen Fisher distinguishes three basic brain systems:6 sexual desire, romantic love, and attachment. The first is associated with the hormone testosterone in both men and women. The second is linked to dopamine, a neurotransmitter involved in motivation/reward behaviours, norepinephrine, and low serotonin activity. The third is correlated with the secretion of neuropeptides such as oxytocin and vasopressin. All three systems are part of primary survival mechanisms produced by evolution.

Human beings belong to the 3% of mammals that form couples to raise their offspring.7 Monogamy is rare among mammals because it is not advantageous for a male to stay with a single female when he can have multiple sexual encounters to transmit his genes. In these conditions, why have we evolved towards exclusive relationships? Partly because an infant depends on her parents,8 which remain united until the child becomes autonomous. If the couple have multiple children, its lifespan extends.

Cultural factors also likely played a part in the development of monogamy.9 Anthropologist Jack Goody, relying on the work of Ester Boserup and ethnographic data from 186 cultures, notes that the sexual division of labour differs between populations practicing shifting horticulture and those practicing agriculture with plough. The latter population is associated with private property, where men predominantly work in the fields, and marriages tend to be monogamous to preserve land within the group. The transition to this kind of practice would have occurred in the Neolithic and would have been consolidated by religious, moral, and political practices.

Although there is an inclination towards monogamy in humans,10 it should be tempered by its regular time limitation, notably due to divorce. In Europe,11 during the period 1964-2021, the marriage rate was halved, while the divorce rate multiplied by 2.5:

The relative stabilization of rates from 2004 indicates that about half of marriages end in divorce. Moreover, extramarital affairs are common, whether the couple is married or not. In 2020, the United States had the highest infidelity rate at 71%, followed by Germany (68%) and the United Kingdom (67%). France ranked sixth at 57%.12

With such data, how can the meeting of a soulmate, a “prince charming,” or a life partner remain a theme of idealizations portrayed by novelists and screenwriters? Besides, passion generally fades after two to three years for the minority of couples experiencing an exclusive long-term relationship. In rarer instances, it diminishes after six to ten years of cohabitation.13

Could part of the answer lie in the perpetuation of customs associated with previously mentioned cultural factors? Probably also in the historical interaction that may have existed between love and freedom. As sociologist Eva Illouz points out in The End of Love,

the genre of romantic comedy, which emerged with the Greek Menander, continued with the Romans (Plautus and Terence’s plays), and flourished in the Renaissance, emphasized the freedom claimed by young people against their parents, guardians, and elders. [. . .] While in India or China, love stories were underpinned by religious values where love was an integral part of the gods’ lives and put up with social authority, in Western Europe (and, to some extent, Eastern Europe) and the United States, love gradually detached from religious cosmology to be cultivated by aristocratic elites seeking a specific way of life.14

Thus, the successful novel by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Julie ou la Nouvelle Héloïse, promoted the possibility of choosing one’s spouse. The romantic freedom of the 18th century evolved hand in hand with philosophical freedom, as both opposed religious, moral, or political traditions. Did this historical conjunction not contribute to the idealization of both love and freedom?

On the level of family practices, with the rise of the bourgeoisie and under the influence of evangelicalism in the United Kingdom in the early 19th century,15 the ideal of a house with a garden became entrenched in customs. It stemmed from a Puritan religious impulse opposing the ‘spiritual and moral decadence of the 18th-century society,”16 be it that of an aristocracy leading a castle life or that of a French Revolution placing philosophical principles above religious values. In this context, the house represented a haven of purity and peace in a world of pride and sin. It participated in a new separation between economic or political affairs and the family, between the public and the private.

Whether it’s passionate love or enduring love, biological factors also contribute to the formation of idealizations. As Fisher advances,

Lovers also feel a rush of exhilaration when thinking about him or her, a form of “intoxication.” As their obsession builds, the lover seeks to interact with the beloved more and more, known in addiction literature as “intensification.” They also think obsessively about their beloved, a form of intrusive thinking fundamental to drug dependence. Lovers also distort reality, change their priorities and daily habits to accommodate the beloved, and often do inappropriate, dangerous, or extreme things to remain in contact with or impress this special other.17

Neurologically, love addiction can be observed by comparing the brains of happily coupled individuals with the brains of those addicted to drugs such as cocaine or opium: several identical regions of the reward system activate, especially in the nucleus accumbens, which is linked to all kinds of addiction.

The ecstasies related to love, regardless of its type, contribute to its idealization. The reproduction of these experiences becomes a priority over the desire for freedom, which, in fact, contracts around the possibility of experiencing them again. Perhaps more than other kinds of idealization, the universality of love and the intense emotions it generates allow us to understand how idealizations, in general, are linked to forms of bliss (contemplation, fusion…) whose object is not necessarily external to oneself.

Beauty plays a major role in contemplation and in the production of idealizations, contributing to the worlds of fashion and cinema: the physique of models and actors often aims to be literally extraordinary while inspiring beauty standards, in other words informal aesthetic norms that influence behaviours. And we know how much this norm has varied over the decades and centuries. What remains constant is that only a minority of people conform to it.

Regarding sexual love, beyond its addictive aspect, let us note that it aligns, at least culturally through male domination, with the idealization of human power. This is evident in the world of pornography that inspires the customs of young people who have no other model available for their sexual education.

Political Principles and Justice

According to Aristotle, there is only a social evolution step from love to politics: politics is natural, it stems from familial attachment and from the progressive expansion of communities that come to form the most autonomous city possible. The happiness of citizens depends on this autonomy. Justice, as the ultimate virtue, synthesizes all virtues through which it is possible to be happy. While these features of Athenian politics may seem modern, it is important to specify that the justice in question is not independent of the laws of the city, and these laws, through mythical legislators, possess a sacred character. Laws do not result from a decision-making process free from constraints; they are elaborated by human beings subject to an inevitable determinism.

Beyond Aristotelian philosophy, in ancient Greece, justice and politics are intimately linked: in the myth of the creation of the city recounted by Plato in his Protagoras, Zeus grants humans modesty and justice “to serve as rules for the cities and unite men through the bonds of friendship.”18 Unlike the arts, where an expert in a field (e.g., medicine) suffices for a large number of laypeople, justice is granted to all “because cities could not exist if these virtues were, like the arts, the exclusive prerogative of a few.”19

Immersed in these traditions, Greek philosophers, starting with Socrates, sought to outline a common good accessible to everyone through their intellectual resources, especially because, with the historical inquiries of Herodotus or the political upheavals of the fifth century and, in particular, the advent of democracy, morality no longer followed naturally from tradition; it became relative to a historical-geographical context. The relativity of moral orientations was thus highlighted by the Sophists, opposed by most philosophers except for the skeptics. Despite this underlying trend, modernity has implicitly endorsed it through, on one hand, the distinction between science and ethics (Hume) and, on the other hand, a justice power independent of the legislative and the political powers (Montesquieu), creating tension with the universalism of the Enlightenment. Currently, justice is defined as conformity to the law, which varies from one state to another, from one group to another.

The fact that ethics, in the broad sense, does not benefit from foundations as stable as those of the sciences does not imply that it is not anchored in biological processes such as those associated with attachment, love, empathy, or the need for recognition,20 as Aristotle had already perceived, and Darwin further clarified in a more scientific manner. The strength of ethical and political convictions probably lies in these anchors, which are associated with strong emotions and deep sentiments. From this perspective, moral principles and, particularly in our secular societies, political principles express social adherence, an attachment to one or more communities.

Contemporary Western politics is largely oriented by the two principles of freedom and equality, which are foundational to justice. However, to what extent can we speak of orientation if interpretations of these notions diverge to the point of radically opposing each other? Moreover, if political convictions are incompatible, how can justice be universal? A universal aspiration for justice has probably developed in humans over the course of evolution because it contributed to the survival of the species.21 However, the existence of a common desire for justice throughout humanity does not imply that the principles and laws on which it is based are the same everywhere and at all times.

In this context, idealizing political principles means setting them as a goal while overlooking the fact that they cannot be concretely achieved if their definition remains controversial or does not correspond to any reality.22 Idealizing justice amounts to avoiding the issue of the relativity of the values, laws, and norms on which it is based. The result is a gap between the idea and reality.

Take the example of fictions that deal with justice while their primary motive is revenge. These fictions are innumerable and can provide a biased image of justice, which is supposed to socially sublimate revenge. However, when an individual kills a person dear to a law enforcement representative, and the latter executes the former, even if the second murder does not break the law, does revenge not remain at the forefront? Furthermore, does the indefinite repetition of this kind of scenario not express a frustration with the absence of justice in reality?

How can justice extend further in a world where ideals, beyond reach or accessible only to a minority, guide actions? I often smile when I hear a star (celebrity, champion, leader…) preach that one must pursue their dreams to the end, because the positions at the top of the social pyramid are, by definition, limited in number. Going to the end of one’s “dreams” often means engaging in a ruthless competition to reach the summit and, implicitly, endorsing this competition rather than questioning and examining social ideals.

The Individual

While politics is rooted in love, competition (especially the economic one) contributes to contemporary individualism. In The Care of the Self23, Michel Foucault distinguishes three individualistic attitudes: the one “characterized by the absolute value attributed to the individual in his singularity, and by the degree of independence granted to him in relation to the group to which he belongs or the institutions to which he belongs; the valorisation of private life, that is, the importance recognized in family relationships, forms of domestic activity, and the domain of heritage interests; finally, the intensity of self-relations, that is, the forms in which one is called to take oneself as an object of knowledge and a domain of action, in order to transform oneself, correct oneself, purify oneself, and achieve salvation.”

The value of an individual can reflect the courage he shows during a war conflict, his ability to prevail over others. Private life refers to the family sphere that particularly developed in the 19th century and was discussed in relation to love. Self-relations concern a fairly broad domain that encompasses different forms of ancient philosophies and spiritualities.24

Do these three attitudes suffice to describe contemporary individualisms? I would add a relational category, that of friends and more generally the contacts one develops, notably through social networks. Friendship has always held a special place in the eyes of philosophers, starting with those of Aristotle, who addressed this theme at length. He conceived of friendship as a relationship between alter egos, between individuals seeing in the other a reflection of themselves.25

Now, what do we call the self? It is not a question here of entering into the philosophical and psychological debates, only to stay at the level of the idea or image we have of ourselves, an idea that we convey to others. But is this idea not most often an ideal? Is there not a tendency to embellish, especially to overestimate oneself? For example, Daniel Kahneman observed during his research a bias of overconfidence, that is, excessive confidence in what we believe we know, and our apparent inability to recognize the extent of our ignorance and the uncertainty of the world in which we live. We are inclined to overestimate our understanding of the world and underestimate the role of chance in events.26

Is the coveted ideal entirely the result of imaginations and intuitions that are unique to us? Does it not correspond in some measure to the combination of multiple social ideals, especially those mentioned earlier? The self appears, from this perspective, as the intertwining of common ideals. It unfolds in the culture of personal universes that fit into one or more social spheres (family, friends, work, arts, politics, sports, etc.). Complementarily, aligning with ancient individualism, it can also be characterized by the singularity of thoughts, actions, and experiences, as well as the possibility that these are inscribed in collective memory. In this second approach, the individual presents himself more as a unique being, a uniqueness that is part of human dignity.

Contemporary individualism is not limited to building a personal universe or becoming aware of a certain uniqueness; it continues through a quest for recognition, both private and increasingly public on social networks. But does not the interdependence of people who establish connections in the hope of obtaining recognition interfere with the autonomy aspired to by the Enlightenment? How can we intellectually emancipate ourselves if we constantly seek various forms of social recognition? Are we not remaining dependent on the prejudices and idealizations to which the circles in which we move adhere? And if that’s the case, does not individualism emerge impoverished, shaping customized replicas based on models instead of generating original human beings?

Continue the reflection: These Individualisms, which are Based on Idealizations and Hinder the Freedom of Thought


Notes

1. Vulnerability is reflected in ancient Greece in the fable of Epimetheus reported in Plato’s Protagoras

2. Jean-Paul Demoule, Les dix millénaires oubliés qui ont fait l’histoire, Paris, Fayard, 2017.

3. Les cinq surprises du télescope James-Webb (lemonde.fr)

4. Cf. L’Épopée du concept de nature (not translated in English).

5. Synthèse conceptuelle des modélisations en économie et en sociologie, et plus largement en sciences – Damien Gimenez

6. Helen Fisher, Anatomy of Love: A Natural History of Mating, Marriage, and Why We Stray, W. W. Norton & Company, 2017.

7. Ibid.

8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monogamy#Biological_arguments.The term altriciality, to describe infant dependence, frequently appears in scientific literature.

9. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monogamy#Cultural_arguments

10. Ryan Schacht and Karen L. Kramer, “Are We Monogamous? A Review of the Evolution of Pair-Bonding in Humans and Its Contemporary Variation Cross-Culturally”, Front. Ecol. Evol., vol. 7, 17 July 2019, URL: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fevo.2019.00230/full

11. Marriage and divorce statistics – Statistics Explained (europa.eu)

12. Infidelity Rates by Country 2023 (worldpopulationreview.com) .

13. Helen Fisher, op. cit.

14. Eva Illouz, La fin de l’amour, Seuil, 2020.

15. Philippe Ariès et Georges Duby (dir.), Histoire de la vie privée. De la Révolution à la Grande guerre, Seuil, 1987, p. 55-87.

16. Ibid.

17. Helen Fisher, op. cit. Je traduis.

18. Platon, Protagoras, Euthydème, Gorgias, Ménexène, Ménon, Cratyle, Flammarion, 2016.

19. Ibid.

20. We mentioned it in the previous article.

21. Mario Gollwitzer and Jan Willem van Prooijen, “Psychology of Justice” in Clara Sabbagh, Manfred Schmitt (ed.), Handbook of Social Justice Theory and Research, Springer, 2016, p. 61-82.

22. About the question of freedom, see (not translated): La question de la liberté; https://damiengimenez.fr/de-la-preponderance-du-choix-dans-les-cultures-occidentales/

23. Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité III, Le souci de soi, Gallimard, 2013 (1984), chapter II.

24. See on this topic (not translated) : Philosopher pour se transformer : le tournant technico-moral du cynisme, de l’épicurisme et du stoïcisme – Damien Gimenez

25. Jean Brun, Aristote et le lycée, PUF, 1999.

26. Daniel Kahneman, Système 1 / Système 2, Les deux vitesses de la pensée, Flammarion, 2016.


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