While the end of the 20th century, after the collapse of the USSR, might have raise hopes for a lasting ebb of conflicts and tensions between states,1 the wars in Ukraine and in the Middle East remind us that the trend can be reversed. On the domestic political scenes, oppositions remain systematic outside of national dramas while, on the economic front, competition continues to intensify with the development of countries long considered as peripheral. Regarding ethical questions, in which I include health, environmental and religious concerns, they continue to stir up the most diverse animosities, frequently pushing potential agreements beyond the realm of possibility. One might imagine finding a haven of relative peace in the academic world, but it faces economic constraints, divides on moral issues, and is subject to intellectual competition, complementary to political or economic struggles – as evidenced by various controversies around manipulated scientific articles.
What remains as a sphere of tranquillity? That of family and friends? Perhaps to some extent. However, is it not crossed by the previously mentioned dissensions? What morality could isolate itself from perpetual oppositions when connected to it through education, work, or various means of communication? Moreover, can one aspire to inner peace by retreating behind walls that protect only for a night, a weekend, or a holiday?
There remains the individual, magnified by a number of philosophical or religious currents, who could achieve, through an appropriate method or « personal development », a state of inner tranquillity despite external turbulence. However, just like for family and friends, how can a person experience a form of peace when inevitably faced with multiple oppositions? Is one not obligated to take a « position » or « side » in a number of debates? And does not any position lead towards a form of antagonism?
Highlighting the omnipresence of oppositions may seem naive, particularly because they, as the backdrop to human relationships, are self-evident. Are they not trivial in the first place because they are trivialized, considered natural or socially necessary? Complementarily, questioning their omnipresence may seem incongruous to the extent that it would amounts to admit a weakness and would imply a “reality” denial. However, how can one accept a reality that is not questioned and, consequently, cannot be understood?
Philosophically and sociologically, the term opposition has not been widely adopted, unlike those of domination and slavery, struggle, conflict and war, criticism or competition. In this article we will survey the concepts of domination, conflict, competition and criticism, which are the most general, to illustrate that the idea of opposition subsumes them and allows us to think the omnipresence of oppositions in human interactions. These four notions, as we will emphasize, are closely related to Western philosophical thoughts.
Ancient Greece, Cultural Source of Oppositions
Conflict and Domination
In Greek mythology, chaos, a kind of gaping chasm, is located at the origin of the world. From it, the gods are born, who quickly, in addition to having intercourse and procreating, come to wage war among themselves. Conflict appears in these narratives as one of the first activities after the emergence of life. It precedes the advent of Zeus, who, through his dominance, establishes a relative peace among the gods, while human beings, wandering in the age of iron, are subjected to the will of celestial powers. The latter « bestow upon them atrocious sufferings. Yet, some happiness will come to mix with their sorrow. »2
The primordial struggle is philosophically found in Heraclitus, according to whom « war is the father of all things, and of all things, he is the king; it is he who makes some gods and others men, that some are slaves while others are free. »3 It is observed in Empedocles in the relation of the elements to each other, governed by Love and Hate: « The craftsman and author of the generation of all things born is the deadly Hate; on the other hand, Love is responsible for the exit of the generated from the world, their change, and their restoration in the One. »4
The world conceived by Greek thinkers is based on opposites (hot/cold, dry/moist, day/night…). However, the « metaphor which gave rise to the name ta enantia [opposite, contrary] is that of hostile warriors facing each other in battle. . . Even in the scholarly language of the Lyceum, this imagery persists. If, says Aristotle, fire becomes air and air becomes water, it is because the dry has been « overpowered » by the damp, the hot by the cold. »5 Just as among the gods, a complementarity between conflict and domination is evident: the second resolves, at least temporarily, the first. In Xenophanes, the One dominates everything, while in Heraclitus, harmony is achieved through logos, reason. However, « knowledge consists only in one thing: recognizing that a thought governs all things through everything. »6
Dominance, as a factor of harmony, is thus perceived positively insofar as it does not lead to a form of tyranny7, especially on the political level: Athens, as the dominant city of the 5th century, is criticized in proportion to the injustices it commits. Furthermore, it boasts its power, which reflects a form of celestial blessing. If dominance seems to have political safeguards, it should be noted that in ancient Greece three social groups—slaves, women, and children—are strongly dominated without arousing feelings of injustice comparable to those expressed in relations between men and between cities.
Competition and Criticism
On political, economic, and sports levels, competitions already constitute a peaceful counterpart to armed conflicts and excessive dominations in ancient Greece. Compared to these, they are more regulated by laws, contracts, and rules, which, through their explicit and public nature, shield from the uncertainties of informal relationships. It is particularly characteristic of a tyrant to go back on his words, leaving those who fall under his control in uncertainty, generating anxiety about taking action with their attitude. However, it should be noted that formalization does not exclude injustice, as a law or a set of rules can be unjust from their formulation or lead to an inequitable situation.
Critique represents a distinct category of opposition, perhaps the one to which we are most intellectually attached since the Enlightenment. In ancient Greece, it emerged simultaneously with philosophy in the city-state, a place where it was possible to express one’s opinions more freely than in the past. Critical thinkers are not limited to the formulation of negative, spontaneous, and disjointed judgments; they engage in the development of comprehensive conceptions of the world, more natural8 and rational. They strive to point out the errors of others while supporting the coherence and validity of their own theses.
In The Epic of the Concept of Nature,9 I sought to spotlight the intertwining of science and ethics among Greek philosophers. The quest for truth in which they were engaged was inseparably connected to that of the good, a good closely associated with the city. One of the greatest upheavals of the Enlightenment was to establish a distinction between science and ethics. Despite this rupture, or rather because it was accomplished through critique, the latter became institutionalized. It remained central in debates (political, economic, academic…), primarily considered as healthy, in contrast to its historical absence linked with tyrannies. To question critique, it is necessary to place it in a historical perspective, particularly to ask whether it constitutes the only and best means of reaching truths as well as political, moral or personal orientations.
Modern Oppositions
Persistence of Domination
A significant obstacle that obstructs the path to questioning criticism is the contemporary persistence of multiple forms of tyrannies and, more rarely, enslavements. It is possible to extend the meaning of domination in order that it appears as an alienation, in other words, an unconsciousness of the motives that drive action, for example, when passions dominate reason. However, by extending domination to that degree, it becomes elusive, with everyone finding themselves in one way or another dominated. That’s why I restrict it to the meaning of command, of an authority that imposes thoughts and actions through various artifices. Domination was perceived positively in ancient Greece if it was consensual, but over the centuries, its positive aspect has decreased, particularly under the influence of the freedom principle.
Thus, the United States can be viewed with ambivalence: on one hand, some criticize its domination because it contradicts the freedom of certain peoples or countries; on the other hand, it has been accused of not intervening sufficiently to save the oppressed or democracy. The gradual decline of its supremacy can be worrisome, especially when observing that the alternatives are not less domination but more. Examples from China and Russia prove that tyranny, whether collective or individual, still occurs and spreads. Those of Donald Trump in the United States or the Rassemblement National in France raise fears of the return of authoritarianism in the West. In such a context, how can we try to imagine more peaceful social conditions when the priority, unfortunately, remains to secure democracy benefits?
Besides, what do we want to prioritize? The possibility of electing representatives or the acquisition of a certain amount of wealth? If such a dilemma was not that of previous generations, it concerns us. Indeed, democracy and wealth have developed together since the late 18th century, but can this continue, both economically (due to automation) and environmentally? In any case, economic competition is intensifying, favouring the emergence and domination of economical « empires » whose interests go beyond the borders of their country of origin. Moreover, on the Internet, we regularly witness a winner-take-all scenario: the company that develops the best solution takes hold of almost the entire market, as Google did with its search engine in the 2000s.
Within companies, domination is the rule, a society being primarily directed hierarchically, except for organizations like cooperatives. This part of submission can be alleviated when pleasure emanates from economic activity, when a social « meaning » is attributed to it, or when working hours are reduced as much as possible. However, in a difficult global context like the one that seems to persist indefinitely since 2008, the probability of limiting economic domination dwindles.
Many other types of domination (religious, familial, masculine, etc.) could be mentioned, but I limit myself here to politics and the economy, which are the two main structuring activities of our time.
Are Conflicts Necessaries?
If the domination of Zeus in Greek mythology helped limit conflicts, can we say that, in general, domination restricts struggles? Or is there rather a vicious circle of this kind?
As evident as this sequence may appear, it is not sufficient to inquire about means to stop it, notably because domination and conflicts are partly natural and can be conceived as socially necessary. The naturalness of conflicts was conceptualized by Darwin within the framework of natural selection through the expression ‘struggle for existence.’ In The Origin of Species, the English biologist uses this notion in a metaphorical sense because, according to him, it includes “dependence of one being on another, and [it includes] (which is more important) not only the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny.”10 To theorize this struggle, he draws inspiration from Malthus’s law of population, according to which a population grows geometrically, faster than subsistence. He extends the principle of geometric growth to the entire biological realm and outlines several factors that limit population expansion, favouring the struggle for existence: exposure to predators, scarcity of resources, climate that can lead to food shortages, diseases, or dependence on other populations. Let us note that Darwin uses the terms struggle and competition interchangeably, although they are not synonymous. Indeed, competition involves the simultaneous pursuit by several individuals of the same advantage or result. It can unfold in a conflictual or non-conflictual manner. Struggle or conflict can arise due to the pursuit of the same advantage but also for other reasons such as hatred between individuals, revenge, tyranny, etc.
In The Descent of Man, Darwin underlines sexual selection, which he differentiates from natural selection. The former induces competition among males of the same species for the conquest of females. Females play an active role in the selection process by choosing certain males over others (those with the most beautiful colours, the best singers, the most capable of protecting them, etc.).
If, from a biological standpoint, conflicts prove to be partly necessary in other species, are they socially necessary in human beings? Enlightenment philosophers sought paths toward a more peaceful coexistence by resorting to appropriate conceptualizations (state of nature, human rights, social contract, political representation…) and relying on historical examples (Rome, Sparta, and Athens). Regarding the state of nature, some, like Hobbes, conceived it as eminently conflictual, in contrast with a more benevolent stage, as in Rousseau’s case. Archaeological data seem to support the latter, with the oldest unambiguous traces of wars dating back to about 10,000 years, i.e., after the Neolithic agricultural revolution.11
Although Enlightenment thinkers worked towards social appeasement, they were not particularly democratic. Traditionally, philosophy resolves conflicts through concepts, somehow leaning towards a form of idealism, one of the most extreme manifestations of which was probably embodied by Hegel. In other words, tensions dissolve thanks to the domination of certain ideas and narratives over minds (as has been the case since the earliest religions). Pacification, following such a dynamic, isn’t it destined to remain limited? Moreover, how can the domination of political concepts be compatible with the distinction between science and ethics?
German sociologist Georg Simmel (turn of the 20th century), influenced by Kant, wrote an essay on conflict, illustrating a philosophical and sociological tendency. In this essay, he considers that there is a “quite primary need for hostility”12 in human beings, which can be observed in primitive peoples.13 In an ancient vein, relying on the fundamental presence of opposing elements, he states:
It is not true that one would always obtain a richer and fuller collective life if the repulsive energies were eliminated, which are also, when considered in isolation, destructive [. . .] but we would have an equally unreal picture as if we had eliminated the forces of cooperation and sympathy, solidarity, and harmony of interests [. . .] Thus, for example, the opposition of one element to another to which it is linked by socialization is not only a negative social factor because, in many cases, it is the only means that allows us to live with truly unbearable personalities. If we did not have the power and the right to oppose tyranny and whim, mood swings, and lack of tact, we would not tolerate at all our relationships with people whose character makes us suffer in this way.14
According to G. Simmel, conflict constitutes an elementary form of socialization that is just as essential as cooperation.15 The relationship between men and women provides an example: “Between men and women, a completely elementary aversion, or even a feeling of hatred, without any particular reason but which is a kind of reciprocal repulsion of the whole being, is sometimes the first stage of relationships, the second stage of which will be passionate love.”16
Ubiquity and Limited Naturalness of Competition
Conflicts and domination, although common, are not necessarily daily occurrences, unlike competition, which extends to practically every social sphere. Competition can develop spontaneously in children who feel jealousy towards one of their parents and, more generally, who appropriate things. Does this type of behaviour mean that psychological appropriation is innate? The question stirs scientific controversies.17 In any case, competition is inculcated from a young age through games whose goal is to win against one or more opponents while respecting a certain number of rules. Then sports, academic, and sexual competitions come into play before young adults are initiated into the reigning category of our time: economic competition. Those who engage in politics, according to Raymond Aron, participate in « peaceful competition for the exercise of power. »18 Intellectuals, on the other hand, engage in structural competition under the sign of criticism. Artistic activities may be considered less competitive if practiced for pleasure without a particular desire to compare one’s work to that of others. In practice, this is rarely the case, especially if one tries to make a living from her passion. Even in charitable activities and religions, competition creeps in when there is a form of hierarchy and therefore positions to covet. In short, we hardly have a choice but to enter into competition.
The ubiquity of competition can be partly explained, as we have seen, by natural and sexual selection. However, this explanation has its limits: some humans biological processes derive from evolution itself and contribute to ethical behaviours such as attachment, love, empathy, cooperation, or the need for recognition.19 According to Darwin, our moral sense is a « highly complex sentiment – originating in the social instincts, largely guided by the approbation of our fellow-men, ruled by reason, self-interest, and in later times by deep religious feelings, and confirmed by instruction and habit.”20 Riane Esler and Douglas P. Fry, in Nurturing our Humanity21, emphasize that Darwin does not have an exclusively egocentric view of the human being, unlike an evolutionary trend represented in particular by Richard Dawkins (The Selfish Gene). Promoting cooperation, they mention experiments in which babies cry more when they hear recordings of cries from other babies rather than their own. Babies also seem inclined, from the age of one, to alleviate the distress of a person by stroking them or offering them a toy. From eighteen months onwards, they provide assistance to someone who seems to need it, without any reward, indicating that their motivation comes from empathy and altruism rather than the expectation of a reward.22
Justifications for competition based on natural causes are also limited because, to think, Homo sapiens relies on a vast and increasingly externalized memory capable of assimilating the knowledge produced by previous generations. Thinking does not add up to imitating and reproducing what already exists; the history of philosophy and science illustrates how exerting oneself induces questioning. However, it is not enough to call things into question to change. The questioning can be ephemeral, lead only to accessory adjustments, or amplify a trend instead of reversing it. Thus, communism, in practice (while Marxist theory aims at emancipation), led to regimes of human exploitation that were generally more constraining than the capitalism-liberalism couple. In passing, the resulting historical legacy contributes to hinder the emergence of possible economic and political alternatives.
Beyond biological and psychological considerations, the limited naturalness of competition is observed in its historicity: competition has not always been as widespread since the Neolithic revolution. Distinguishing it from domination and conflict illustrates that these latter forms of opposition have occupied more social space in the past. The advent of economic competition, at the dawn of the industrial era, went hand in hand with the decline of political domination in the West. Economic development was thus perceived as a peaceful alternative to conflicts between states.23
Facing the contemporary excess of competition, more cooperation can be proposed.24 But can cooperation replace competition? Grounding its reasoning in evolution, social psychologist Jonathan Haidt theorized the complementarity of competition and cooperation:25 while individuals compete with each other, aiming for their personal interest – cooperative strategies can intervene at this level – groups also compete with each other, favouring cooperative attitudes and team spirit. Can we imagine a world where competition does not structure human relationships as much as the market has since the 18th century? Probably, but putting it into practice seems difficult to envisage, except in the event of a cataclysm in the coming decades given the geopolitical context.
A Usual Criticism
Critique often falls within the framework of a competition aiming for truth (scientific, aesthetic, or moral) or a social position. Indeed, a value judgment, when expressed publicly, seems to invite another, a discordant one. Like economic competition, which was deemed a social improvement, criticism has historically been perceived positively as it is intertwined with the freedoms of thought and expression. Certainly, but is that a reason for it to intrude into a myriad of writings and conversations? Does aiming for truth requires systematically to criticize existing judgments and theses? Could we not draw inspiration from certain elements and omit those that do not support our proposals? Why destroy before building?
As we have suggested, this practice is based on a set of habits or customs of thought and action, at least since ancient Greece. Interactions are conceived in an antagonistic manner, especially discussions, as if war permeated everything, inspiring the desire for opposition even in the absence of a particular motive. Truth and freedom appear in this framework as the offspring of oppositions. Furthermore, the Judeo-Christian struggle of good against evil weaves a comparable pattern of social interactions, internalizing and individualizing it further. In addition, as mentioned, the Enlightenment strengthened these habits of thought by establishing criticism as a means of weakening domination.
Regarding competition for a social position, it seems to me that a concrete reason contributes to criticism: since organizations are often structured pyramidally and their highest positions are among the most coveted, it is not always enough to propose an attractive direction and/or justify achieved results to access them; it becomes necessary to sideline opponents, for example, by undermining their credibility. In such a context, accusations can easily degenerate into conflict.
While historically criticism has favoured the discovery of truths and the emergence of freedoms, it does not mean that it is indispensable. However, criticize it would not make it wane, as doing so one would only play by its rules and feed an endless cycle of oppositions, amplified by anger and resentment.
Notes
1.↑ Actual decrease in the number of deaths due to interstate wars: War and Peace – Our World in Data
2.↑ Hésiode, Théogonie, Les Travaux et les Jours et autre poèmes, Libraire Générale Française, 1999, p. 103.
3.↑ Héraclite, Fragments, Flammarion, 2004, p. 126. See also Comment les philosophes concevaient la nature avant Platon et dans quelle mesure leurs vues différaient de celles du polythéisme – Damien Gimenez
4.↑ Jean-Paul Dumond, Les Présocratiques, Gallimard, 1988, p. 379. It may be striking to note that generation arises from Hate, and not the other way around as it is the case in Christianity.
5.↑ Kahn, Charles, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, Columbia University Press, 1960, p. 130. Aristotle’s quote : On Generation and Corruption, 331a 28-35.
6.↑ Héraclite, op. cit., p. 159.
7.↑ Justice, vérité et nature dans la Grèce du Ve siècle AEC – Damien Gimenez
8.↑ https://damiengimenez.fr/comment-les-philosophes-concevaient-la-nature-avant-platon-et-dans-quelle-mesure-leurs-vues-differaient-de-celles-du-polytheisme/
9.↑ https://damiengimenez.fr/introduction-a-lepopee-du-concept-de-nature-du-viiie-au-ive-siecle-aec/ (in French)
10.↑ Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, John Murray, 1872, p. 50.
11.↑ Riane Esler and Douglas P. Fry, Nurturing our Humanity: How Domination and Partnership Shape our Brains, Lives and Future, Oxford University Press, 2019, chapter 7.
12.↑ Georg Simmel, Le conflit, Circé, 2015, p. 40.
13.↑ Ibid., p. 42.
14.↑ Ibid., p. 42.
15.↑ Julien Freund, who wrote the preface, agrees with G. Simmel. He clearly writes what motivates him: “In the aftermath of the war, during which I was involved in ordeals . . . from being a hostage and a resistance fighter to two years in prison and camp, I aspired to a philosophy and sociology less intellectualized and closer to authentic experience and that would take into account what good feelings considered as negative acts or negative relationships.”
16.↑ Ibid., p. 25.
17.↑ See this article that summarizes the question of psychological appropriation or this one that reports an experimentation with children.
18.↑ Raymond Aron, Introduction à la philosophie politique, Éditions de Fallois, 1997, p. 36.
19.↑ On this matter, see particularly: Patricia Churchland, Conscience: The Origins of Moral Intuition, W. W. Norton & Company, 2019; Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion, Penguin Books, 2012.
20.↑ Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, John Murray, 1896, p. 132.
21.↑ Riane Esler and Douglas P. Fry, op. cit.
22.↑ Ibid., chapter 2.
23.↑ Particularly among Scottish philosophers and Montesquieu. Cf. Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph, Princeton University Press, 2013 (1977).
24.↑ The US essayist Alfie Kohn, in No Contest: The Case Against Competition, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 1986, synthesizes a large number of criticisms against competition and promotes cooperation.
25.↑ Jonathan Haidt, op. cit. According to Haidt, evolution operates at the individual and, more controversially, the population level.