Projection, a Major Obstacle to Distancing

​As mentioned in a previous snapshot1, the time has come to address the notion of distance. It seems to me that this concept is mainly understood in a negative way, as the negation of an excessive proximity. In previous articles, we have focused on oppositions, idealizations, and the desire for recognition, all of which, in their own way, demonstrate a reduced or even nonexistent distance. Here, we will examine the concept of projection, starting by discussing empathy, which has been remarkably successful over the past twenty years. Then we will support the hypothesis that the various forms of projection, in addition to being abilities, are deeply ingrained cultural habits. Finally, we will explore the dangers of projection and the possibilities of limiting these psychological processes.

Empathy, Synchronization and Projection

The Popularity of Empathy

​Since the beginning of the 21st century, the concept of empathy has generated particular media and scientific enthusiasm. A Google Scholar search for the term « empathy » yields the following results2 :

Decade​	Articles containing ’empathy’	Articles whose title includes ’empathy’​
1950-1999	315 000	7 060
2000-2009	394 000	6 430
2010-2019	1 230 000	16 500
2020-2024	261 000	14 200

After a significant increase in academic interest in empathy during the 2000s, there was a surge in the number of publications mentioning the term or including it in their title starting from 2010. This success helped clarify the concept, which had previously been particularly vague3. According to neuroscientist Jean Decety, empathy can be broken down into three components4 :

Must all components be present for empathy to occur?5 No, regarding the third component: unlike sympathy, which involves concern for others, empathy does not necessarily entail a drive toward the other. As for the emotional and cognitive components, scientific consensus indicates that both must be present for the term empathy to be used: while the emotional component is triggered automatically, the cognitive component helps regulate the emotional response. Their interactions make them inseparable.

The rise in the popularity of empathy has thus helped clarify its meanings. It is also inseparable from its ethical aspects, as many authors6 have presented it as a moral facilitator despite its « dark sides »—the foremost being that emotional empathy tends to be felt more strongly toward people who are similar to us, those we know, or those we can easily imagine. Some voices have spoken against the overwhelmingly positive perception of empathy, particularly that of psychologist Paul Bloom, who has openly positioned himself against empathy7, advocating instead for a more impartial moral compassion that leans towards universalization.

​Development of Empathy through Synchronization

Emotional empathy is not a completely innate ability; it develops in infants during the first few months when they imitate the gestures and expressions of their caregivers,8 especially during positive interactions.9 At this early stage, it’s not yet possible to speak of empathy, as the baby doesn’t distinguish others from themselves. Initially, through synchronization with the adult—mainly via facial expressions—the infant experiences similar emotions and simultaneously develops emotional bonds.10

The term synchronization seems interesting to me because it highlights the automatic and likely innate nature of imitation,11 a process that persists throughout life. It continues in various forms of social interactions where there is some level of closeness between individuals. For example, a study12 showed that synchronizing movements with others fosters the creation of a collective identity and cooperation. Thus, marching in step with fellow soldiers or singing in unison at a gathering (concert, sports event, choir…) stimulates and strengthens interpersonal bonds.13

Anyone can observe, when in the company of a close friend, that their posture tends to synchronize with that person’s, especially if there is agreement in the conversation. Synchronization is even more noticeable in romantic relationships, where it can be seen as a sign of attraction.14

Empathy, therefore, is not a magical ability to feel exactly what the other person feels; it develops through synchronization with others, through imitations based on perceptions of traits and behaviors, which allow for the creation of an emotional repertoire. This repertoire is, to some extent, specific to the culture one belongs to.15

Empathy vs Projection

Emotional empathy consists of perceiving and being sensitive to the emotional states of others. However, what does it mean to “be sensitive” to the emotional states of others? Does it involve trying to feel the same thing, trying to put oneself in their shoes? It is important here, particularly following J. Decety and C. Lamm,16 to distinguish between, on the one hand, imagining the situation in which the person expressing their emotions finds themselves, and, on the other hand, putting oneself in their shoes, imagining oneself (in the first person) in the same situation. In the second case, if the person in question is in some form of distress, then this distress is more likely to affect the observer, who in turn experiences personal distress. Such a dynamic can occur particularly among caregivers, potentially contributing to burnout.17

Neuroscientific studies18 show that when an individual adopts another’s perspective, the neural circuits underlying personal experiences are activated. However, specific areas of the frontal cortex associated with inhibitory control are also activated, allowing for a distinction between perspectives (self/other) and resisting self-projection into the other’s situation. In this context, self-projection consists of:

Self-projection is limited to experiencing something similar but necessarily idiosyncratic, as it is only possible to extrapolate another’s feelings based on what one perceives of their situation.20

How, in light of these elements, can we distinguish emotional empathy from emotional projection? Since we can only infer, often automatically, the emotions of others based on our own emotional repertoire, it seems that emotional empathy and emotional projection are one and the same concept. Emotional empathy lies on a fine line because it must be activated for empathy to be present, but not too much, lest one project emotionally and cognitively by imagining themselves in the other’s place, thereby inadvertently taking on their suffering as it is perceived and interpreted.

Rousseau provides a striking example of projection in his Reveries: “The signs of pain and distress affect me even more, to the point that I find it impossible to bear them without being moved myself by emotions perhaps even more intense than those they represent. Imagination, intensifying the sensation, makes me identify with the suffering being and often gives me more anguish than they feel themselves.”21

To recap: we must distinguish, on the one hand, emotional empathy or projection, which is automatic, intuitive, and based on an emotional repertoire developed in the first months of life, and on the other hand, cognitive empathy, which relies on imagination and conceptual thinking, allowing us to consider the situation of the other person and to limit emotional projection. The latter necessarily plays a role in empathy, as it is identical to emotional empathy, but self-projection (projecting oneself) only occurs when we imagine ourselves in the other’s place. Putting oneself in the place of the other carries the risk, when the other is suffering, of suffering in turn.

The close relationship between projection and empathy reveals the importance of the former. We will now, on the one hand, expand the meanings of projection and, on the other hand, support the hypothesis that the various forms of projection are deeply culturally ingrained.

​Mythical and Philosophical Projections

Projections onto Reality

Let us expand the meaning of projection to encompass everything: it no longer involves putting oneself « in the shoes » of someone else but simply projecting onto reality ideas, emotions, behaviors, etc.—that is, identifying something with one or more ideas, emotions, behaviors, and so on. Attributing one’s own emotions to another person is then a particular case of projection: there is an identification between the emotions of the other and one’s own emotions. With this expanded meaning, it becomes possible to interpret myths and philosophical idealisms as projections onto reality.

According to Henri Frankort, a « Myth is a form of poetry which transcends poetry in that it proclaims a truth; a form of reasoning which transcends reasoning in that it wants to bring about the truth it proclaims. »22 Mircea Eliade, on the other hand, considers a myth to be a story « regarded as absolutely true (because it relates to realities) and sacred (because it is the work of Supernatural Beings). »23 Myths project thoughts, products of imagination, onto reality. Thus, in the Iliad, gods are projected into the background of various war scenes, and extraordinary abilities are projected onto the heroes who play the leading roles.

Philosophically, idealisms since Plato have mapped reality onto ideas, or at least claimed that there is a kind of correspondence24 between the two. According to Francis Bacon, « the human mind resembles those uneven mirrors which impart their own properties to different objects, from which rays are emitted and distort and disfigure them. »25 The correspondence is not perfect, as it is tainted by passions since the fall of Adam and Eve, but originally « God hath framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass, capable of the image of the universal world. »26

Self-projection in The Phenomenology of Spirit

In The Phenomenology of Spirit,​27 Hegel describes the process of recognition between two self-consciousnesses (let’s call them A and B) that encounter one another, with both being initially independent and external to one another. When B presents itself to A, A suppresses B, as it seeks to acquire the certainty of existing independently of B, and does not consider B to be independent. « It is itself that it sees in the Other. » Hegel is describing here a psychological process that amounts to self-projection, that is, imagining oneself in the place of the other and attributing one’s own ideas, emotions, behaviors, etc., to that other: A attributes its own thoughts to B by « seeing » itself in B.

In suppressing B, A also suppresses itself because « this other is itself. » This double suppression restores A as a self-consciousness, making it certain of its existence independently of the other, and in turn, freeing the other. The same double suppression happens for B, and the entire process leads to mutual recognition between the two self-consciousnesses.

This passage from The Phenomenology of Spirit, which precedes the dialectic of the master and slave, provides a key to understanding Hegelian philosophy, which often employs double negation, or suppression, to reach a more advanced stage— a progress. This famous dialectic has significantly influenced modern philosophies, particularly Marxism, existentialism, and pragmatism.

Projection in Everyday Life

Fiction as a Means of Escape

Let’s move from abstract philosophy back to concrete stories which, in many ways, extend myths, especially in terms of heroism. Why are human beings so fond of stories, narratives that, depending on the genre, repeat themselves more or less endlessly? Can’t they simply be satisfied with living their own lives? It seems to me that fiction, beyond the moral virtues we may attribute to it,28 provides a number of compensations for a dissatisfying life. Let’s focus on two genres that are among the most watched and read: action fiction and romances.

Action fiction offers an opportunity for vicarious release after a day spent enduring orders from superiors, remarks from colleagues or classmates, various acts of incivility, complaints or demands from family members, etc. We unwind by projecting ourselves into the action, in the hero’s place, because we don’t identify with the villains! They deserve their fate; they aren’t worthy of the slightest empathy—unless the main character is themselves a villain (screenwriters are fond of ethical dilemmas). The projection here mainly involves three emotions: anger, associated with revenge (the almost exclusive driver of such plots); the stress that the protagonists are systematically subjected to in order to escape seemingly impossible situations; and the joy of seeing the hero or heroes overcome the challenges they face.

Romantic fiction glorifies love, inviting viewers to transport themselves into the place of one of the lovers, to the extent that they can sufficiently identify with them. The typical plot of a Hollywood romantic movie follows this pattern: meeting => attraction => happy moments => breakup => happy ending. Although the story is largely predictable, it isn’t watched or read for the story itself, but for the emotions conveyed by the actors, and the possibility of experiencing those emotions in communion with them.

This is not to reduce the enjoyment of fiction solely to projection. Cognitive empathy, without necessarily putting oneself in a character’s place, can be equally compelling, as can the moral considerations mentioned earlier. However, it’s worth noting how much projection plays a role in entertainment that offers an escape from a burdensome and unsatisfactory everyday life.

Excessive Projection Towards an Anxious and Stressful Future

​How can one not desire to escape when the media relay anxiety-inducing information? When family, social, and moral demands accumulate? When one is under constant economic pressure? Or, more generally, when oppositions keep piling up?29 Sources of anxiety and stress abound in a society that, despite the extraordinary technological progress of the past centuries, remains in an indefinite race for wealth creation.

Predictable anxiety-inducing and stressful situations can stimulate rumination about them: one excessively projects towards them, dwelling on different, more or less pessimistic scenarios. The notion of projection is used here in its common sense of expecting a result, that is anticipating a possible future. It is not negative in itself, of course, since the ability to anticipate is fundamental for humans. However, it becomes negative when imagining the future does not lead to solutions. Projection then turns into an inner prison from which one cannot escape, just as it seems impossible to escape the realities that are themselves sources of anxiety and stress.

It is important to distinguish, on the one hand, excessive projection towards hypothetical feared situations, and on the other hand, the repetitive reminiscence of past events. The latter can generate equally overwhelming anxiety if the recalled events lead to feelings of guilt, or sadness if one feels nostalgic for the memories in question.

Generalizing

Let us return to projection as the attribution of one’s own thoughts or attitudes to others. This tendency can be observed in the bias of generalization, extending what one thinks or does to others. Psychological studies have shown that « people who engage in a particular behavior tend to estimate that behavior to be more prevalent than do people who do not engage in it. »30 An experiment31 specifically demonstrated that the perception of others’ happiness depends on the evaluation of one’s own happiness. Another study32 revealed that victims of a crime tend to perceive its prevalence as higher than those who have not been victims.

A common example of generalization is to declare, « It is in human nature to… » followed by a typical behavior such as: prioritizing self-interest, sharing, waging war, cooperating, coveting, saying one thing and doing another, etc. In this case, there is both projection and, simultaneously, justification of an attitude. Let us again cite Rousseau: « It is in man’s nature to patiently endure the necessity of things, but not the ill will of others. This phrase: ‘there is no more,’ is a response against which no child has ever rebelled, unless they believed it to be a lie. »33 Name me a child who hasn’t gotten angry in the face of a natural necessity before calming down… the first of these being hunger.

Projection, an Ambivalent Capacity

Dangers of Projections for Gaining Perspective

Four meanings of projection have been outlined so far:

1. Putting oneself in another’s place.
2. Attributing one’s own ideas, emotions, behaviors, etc. to another.
3. More generally, identifying a thing with one or more of our own ideas, emotions, or behaviors.
4. Projecting oneself toward a hypothetical future.

We have immediately highlighted the danger of the imagination’s ability to put itself in the place of the other: when the other is suffering, the risk of taking on that suffering increases.

Meanings 2 and 3 correspond to abilities that allow us to understand and evaluate the things and people around us. In this sense, they are essential for navigating a world full of uncertainties. We can only gauge others based on our own emotions, and identify things using words. However, the danger of these projections lies in an excessive identification between the emotion felt by oneself and that of the other, between the word and the thing.

Similarly, when it comes to projection towards dreaded futures, it is in the specific case of anxiety-provoking situations that projection, when it turns into rumination, becomes harmful.

In all the cases mentioned, we can observe that projection is correlated with a lack or even an absence of distance from the objects being considered. I believe it constitutes one of the main cultural obstacles to gaining perspective, as the tendency to project oneself manifests even more strongly toward things and people who are closest to us.

How to Limit Projection?

​The methods to limit projection largely overlap with those aimed at reducing anxiety and stress. While the advice found in psychological books offers interesting keys, I feel that they lack a broader perspective: in such an anxiety-inducing world, we cannot simply offer advice that does not question the society in which we live. I have already suggested something similar regarding meditation: all these techniques can provide temporary relief, but they cannot offer lasting peace if they are not accompanied by deeper reflection.

Thus, I emphasize reflection and analysis: it is important to reflect by expressing our opinions and emotional states, preferably in writing rather than verbally. Writing allows us to revisit what we have noted, to reorganize our thoughts as we see fit. Montaigne understood this, with his repeated essays allowing him to develop a wisdom that helped initiate modernity34 and continues to inspire admiration in a wide contemporary audience.

Since projection is a psychological process and the mind depends on the body, I draw attention to the importance of diet and exercise. Projection, as a lack of distance, can be associated with various compensations through food and with sedentary behaviors, like being glued to a screen or a novel. All of this creates a vicious cycle (centered around the couch) from which it is difficult to break free.

Reflection, healthy eating, and exercise can help break the vicious cycle. Of course, these measures do not guarantee a limitation of projection, as this limitation depends particularly on the abilities, personal history, and willpower of each individual.

Notes

1.↑ https://damiengimenez.fr/wpdgi_snapshot/do-we-want-to-live-in-peace/

2.↑ Search performed on Google Scholar on 13 September 2024.

3.↑ The following meta-analysis identified 43 distinct meanings for the word empathy : Cuff, B. , Brown, S.J. , Taylor, L. and Howat, D. (2014), “Empathy: a review of the concept”. Emotion Review, volume (in press) http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1754073914558466.

4.↑ https://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/empathie/

5.↑ Cuff ​et al.​, ​op. cit.

6.↑ Martin L. Hoffman, Martha Nussbaum, Frans de Waal, Steven Pinker, Jean Decety, Heidi Mailbom…

7.↑ Paul Bloom, Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion, Vintage, 2018.

8.↑ Martin L. Hoffman, Empathy and moral development: implications for caring and justice, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 37 ​sq. Serge Tisseron, L’empathie, PUF, 2024. Frans de Waal, ​The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society​, Random House, 2011.

9.↑ Hess, Ursula, and Agneta Fischer. 2022. “Emotional Mimicry as Social Regulator: Theoretical Considerations.” Cognition and Emotion 36 (5): 785–93. doi:10.1080/02699931.2022.2103522.

10.↑ ​Ibid. ​These connections have been primarily theorized through the concepts of belongingness and attachment, with the former being more general, as the feeling of belonging is not solely dependent on parents but on people with whom a certain level of intimacy develops.

11.↑ ​Ibid. ​Regarding the innate nature of the automatism, cf. M. Hoffman, ​op. cit.

12.↑ Good, Arla, Becky Choma, and Frank A. Russo. 2017. “Movement Synchrony Influences Intergroup Relations in a Minimal Groups Paradigm.” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 39 (4): 231–38. doi:10.1080/01973533.2017.1337015.

13.↑ Lynden K. Miles, Louise K. Nind, C. Neil Macrae. The Rhythm of Rapport: Interpersonal Synchrony and Social Perception. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2009, 45 (3), pp.585.

14.↑ Cohen, M., Abargil, M., Ahissar, M. et al. Social and nonsocial synchrony are interrelated and romantically attractive. Commun Psychol 3, 57 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-024-00109-1

15.↑ Regarding the cultural aspects of emotions, see Lisa Feldman Barrett, How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain, First Mariner Books, 2018 ; Jesse J. Prinz, Beyond Human Nature: How Culture and Experience Shape Our Lives, Penguin Group, 2012. Regarding the universal aspects, see the approach of Paul Ekman, and more generaly the neurobiological approaches.

16.↑ Jean Decety and Claus Lamm, “Empathy versus Personal Distress: Recent Evidence from Social Neuroscience” in Jean Decety and William Ickes, The Social Neuroscience of Empathy, MIT Press, 2009.

17.↑ Delgado N, Delgado J, Betancort M, Bonache H, Harris LT. What is the Link Between Different Components of Empathy and Burnout in Healthcare Professionals? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. Psychol Res Behav Manag. 2023 Feb 15;16:447-463. URL: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9939791/

18.↑ ​Ibid.

19.↑ Raymond S. Nickerson, Susan F. Butler, and Michael Carlin, “Empathy and Knowledge Projection” in Jean Decety and William Ickes, ​op. cit.​

20.↑ ​Ibid. ​: « when one attempts to imagine what it is like to be a specific other person, what one is really doing is imagining what it would be like to be oneself—how one would feel or behave—in the other person’s situation. To feel another’s pain or joy is to imagine one’s own feelings if faced with whatever it is that is producing the pain or joy that the other is experiencing. One can never be certain that one’s own imagined experience in the imagined situation would be, in fact, the same at that of another person who is actually in that situation. »

21.↑ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ​Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire​, Association de Bibliophiles Universels, 1999.

22.↑ Frankfort, Henry and Frankfort H.A., The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man: An Essay of Speculative Thought in the Ancient Near East (Oriental Institute Essays), University of Chicago Press, 2013 (1949).

23.↑ Mircea Eliade, Aspects du mythe, Gallimard, 2011, p. 32.

24.↑ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/

25.↑ Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, The Project Gutenberg. URL: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45988/45988-h/45988-h.htm

26.↑ Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, Henry Morley, 2021. URL : https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5500/5500-h/5500-h.htm

27.↑ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, La Phénoménologie de l’Esprit : tome 1, Aubier-Montaigne, 1939, p. 155 ​sq.

28.↑​ Sandra Laugier, ​Nos vies en série​, Climats, 2019.

29.↑ https://damiengimenez.fr/wpdgi_article_en/on-the-omnipresence-of-oppositions-in-human-interactions/

30.↑ Raymond S. Nickerson, Susan F. Butler, and Michael Carlin, ​op. cit.

31.↑ ​Ibid.​, Goldings 1954.

32.↑ ​Ibid.​, Bennett & Hibberd, 1986.

33.↑ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ​Émile ou De l’éducation​, URL : https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:%C5%92uvres_compl%C3%A8tes_de_Jean-Jacques_Rousseau_-_II.djvu/439

34↑ ​https://damiengimenez.fr/wpdgi_article_en/progress-and-limits-of-freedom-of-thought-in-europe-from-the-16th-to-the-18th-century/